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It is commonly said that the law has, a general rule refusing contribution and indemnity between joint tortfeasors. 1 But a considerable number
of exceptions to the so-called general rule are always stated, 2 and it has
been argued that the exceptions are so numerous that there can no longer be
said to be any general rule denying contribution or indemnity,' in fact, that
the rule denying contribution is itself merely an exception to a general rule
allowing contribution. 4 Actually, however, the rule of no contribution or
indemnity is a broad one, applicable to many cases, closely related to and
springing from the same roots as the numerous other rules in AngloAmerican law which find rough expression in the maxim ex turpi causa non
oritur actioj and it is still alive and vigorous despite many attacks upon it.
Merryweatherv. Nixan,6 the case generally credited with origin of the rule,
does not by any means mark its limits, though it has been even quite recently contended that it does.7 In Merryweather v. Nixan, the joint tortfeasors were intentional wrongdoers, but by the great weight of modern
common law authority, contribution is denied also aS between joint tortfeasors whose liability is based on negligence merely, as distinguished from
intentional wrongdoing.'
The problems of contribution and indemnity, of course closely related,
still present substantial differences. If contribution is to be allowed, a joint
tortfeasor who has been compelled to discharge the whole obligation to the
injured person will recover a ratable portion of such total amount from the
other tortfeasor or tortfeasors, the idea being one of equalization of what
*The author acknowledges great indebtedness to Professors Warren A. Seavey and
Edward S. Thurston of the faculty of the Harvard Law School for many and valuable
suggestions received in the preparation of this paper.
t A. B., 1922, University of Arkansas; LL. B., 1927, S.J. D., 1932, Harvard University;
Professor of Law, University of Kansas Law' School, on leave of absence from University
of Arkansas Law School; member of the Arkansas bar; author of articles in various legal
periodicals.
ToRTs (4th ed. 1926) 260;
'ARNOLD, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (1927) 287; BuRwcI,

CLERK AND LINDSELT, TORTS (8th ed. 1929) 6o; POLLocK, ToRTs (I3th ed. 1929) 2D3; SALmOND, ToRs (7th ed. 1928) 163; I STREET, FOUNDATIOgS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906) 490;
2 id., 240; THROCKMORTON'S CooLEY ON Toars (1930) 185; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS

(1913) 401; KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTS (893) 408. Also, see an excellent note, (1931)
45 HARv. L. R. 349.
'Supra note I.
'Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (859) ; Reath, ContributionBetween Persons Jointly
Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan (1898) 12 HA v. L. R. 176.
'2 STREET, op. cit. supra note I, at 241; Reath, supra note 3.
'The companion maxim, in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis, expresses another aspect of the same idea. See BRoom's LEGAL MAxIM1S (9th ed. 1924) 462, 471.
68 T. R. 186 (K. B. 1799).
SALMOND, ToRTs 103.
8 See infra notes 46 and

63.
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should be a common burden. If indemnity be allowed, the one discharging
the tort obligation is enabled to recover over the whole amount from the
other, on the theory that as between them the primary liability was on the
one against whom indemnity is given. As between tortfeasors, both contribution and indemnity have generally been limited to reimbursement for
payments already made to the injured party, but it is possible in cases in
which both or all tortfeasors are parties to the original action on the tort to
require exoneration as between them provided this can be done without
affecting adversely the interests of the injured party. In this paper, contribution between joint tortfeasors 9 will be dealt with first, and indemnity
will be taken up later.
Contribution
In a number of well known fields the law has manifested its unwillingness to come to the aid of persons whose conduct does not conform to legal
standards, particularly if such persons, in order to make out a case, have
to set up the non-conforming conduct as a part thereof.' 0 The legal logic
used to defend this unwillingness to act may not be very satisfying to socially
minded people; nevertheless, the law has preserved its "hands off" attitude.
Among the conspicuous examples of this attitude are the illegal contract
cases, in which the law will generally refuse all relief unless to one of the
parties who is innocent or for some reason peculiarly deserving of protection, 1 and the doctrine in equity that one seeking relief must come into
court with clean hands.12 The doctrine of contributory negligence has been
'The term "joint tortfeasors" requires definition. In Paddock-Hawley Iron Co. v.
Rice, et at., 179 Mo. 480, 78 S. W. 634 (9o4), it was held under a Missouri statute allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors that the term included only persons between whom
there was intentional unity or concert of action, and excluded persons between whom there
was only an unintended concurrence of activities producing one result. This definition was
clearly changed by Kinloch Tel. Co. v. St. Louis, 268 Mo. 485, 188 S. W. i82 (i916), holding (at 496, 188 S. W. at 184) that the statute "applies to a case of negligent omission of
duty on the part of several tortfeasors which concurred in causing an injury, though
there was no unity or concert of action on their part." The currently accepted definition of the term includes all cases where there is joint liability for a tort, whether the
acts of those jointly liable were concerted, merely concurrent, or even successive in point
of time. This definition has been followed under the statutes allowing contribution, see
infra note 66; in jurisdictions allowing contribution at common law, Mitchell v. Raymond,
181 Wis. 591, i95 N. W. 855 (i923), and other cases cited infra notes 47, 48 and 49; and
in the numerous cases denying contribution, see infra note 46. On the question of joint
liability and joinder of concurrent or successive tortfeasors as defendants in a single action,
see CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 266; and annotations (192o) A. L. R. 939; (1922) I6
A. L. R. 465; (1929) 62 A. L. H. I425.
" See Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. i3o, 65 N. E. 84 (1902); cf. Coppedge v. Goetz Brewing Co., 67 Kans. 85i, 73 Pac. go (i9o3). And see the famous Highwaymen's Case, cited
as Everet v. Williams in i LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIP (1st ed., i86o) I61, note g, and in (1893)
9 L. Q. R. 197. The test of legal condemnation of the plaintiff's case, by which his right
to recover is made to depend upon whether he is skillful enough to set up his claim without
reference to its objectionable aspects, is generally deemed artificial and unfair. A test more
directly dependent on the impropriety of the plaintiff's conduct is demanded. 3 WIwUSTON,
CONTRACTS (920)
§ 1753; WOODwARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § i43.
113 WnI.USTON, CONTRaCTS §§ 1631-32, 1789-91 ; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS §§ 136142.
2

1 PomERoY, EQUrrIY JURISPRUDENCE (4 th ed. ig8) 737.
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variously explained, 18 but however it be explained it is in its operation
clearly another manifestation of the law's unwillingness to aid persons
whose conduct, here taking the form of neglectfulness, is deemed reprehensible, if this conduct has proximate causal connection with the very
injury for which they seek reparation. Another less compact group of
cases controlled by this same tendency of the law to withhold relief is that
in which action is brought for a tort committed by one person upon another
while both of them are engaged in some improper activity. For example,
in Gilmore v. Fuller,1 4 the plaintiff and the defendant together were members of a gang engaging in a noisy and riotous charivari, in the course of
which the defendant fired a gun negligently and wounded the plaintiff.
Recovery was denied on the theory that relief would not be given for an
injury arising out of the plaintiff's own wrongful activity.15
It seems that the rule refusing contribution between joint tortfeasors
is rooted in this same unwillingness of courts to aid persons whose conduct
has not measured up to legal standards. The reasons for the no contribution rule are substantially the same as the reasons for one of the related
rules applied to a corresponding set of facts. This is particularly apparent
when comparison is made of the operation of the no contribution rule in a
negligence case, and the contributory negligence rule in a similar case. They
reach identical results. Conversely, to allow contribution in a negligence
case is in substance the same thing as substitutinga doctrine of comparative
negligence such as is applied.in admiralty cases 16 for the doctrine of contributory negligence.' 7 In either case, the loss would be divided between
the negligent parties, instead of being left to lie where it fell. It should be
pointed out, however, that though support for the no contribution rule apparently must be drawn from the same substantive reasons that are supBohlen, Contributory Negligence (198o)
21 HARv. L. REv. 233.
Supra note IO.
'Accord: Wallace v. Cannon, 38 Ga. i99 (1868) (an interesting product of the Civil
War); McLendon v. Harrell, 67 Ga. 44o (I881) ; Harris v. Hatfield, 71 Ill. 298 (874);
Frye v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., 73 Ill. 399 (1874) ; Jackson v. Lomas, 6o Mont. 8, i98 Pac. 434
(192I); White v. Shawnee Milling Co., 94 Okla. 26o, 221 Pac. io29 (1923); Moore v.
Woodson, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 588, ii6 S. W. 6o8 (i9o9); Aldrich v. Harvey, 5o Vt. 162
(1877). But if the defendant intentionally inflicts upon the plaintiff an injury unconnected
with the illegal enterprise in which they are jointly engaged, he will generally be held
liable. Welch v. Wesson, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 505 (1856). Also, an innocent person fraudulently induced to engage in the illegal enterprise is not barred. Panther v. McKnight, 125
Okla. 134, 256 Pac. 916 (1926). An interesting study, too extended to be undertaken here,
might consider the effect of the tortious act being connected, or unconnected, with the mutual
wrongful enterprise; the effect of the mutual wrongful enterprise in the course of which
the tort occurs being intentionally wrongful, or wrongful merely because negligent; and
the effect of the tortious act being itself an intended act, or tortious merely because negligent.
' 6 The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1, 1I Sup. Ct. 29 (i8go). See infra note 37.
' This fact is recognized in the cases allowing contribution. See Mitchell v. Raymond,
mipra note 9, at 6oo, 195 N. W. at 859, in which it was said, "Such an anomaly is often
the resultant of the application of several rules of law." And see Note (1924) 22 MIcH.
L. REv. 831.
1
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posed to support the doctrine of contributory negligence,"8 there may be
administrative reasons behind the latter doctrine that are irrelevant to the
no contribution rule. For example, it may be feared that a sympathetic
jury passing on a case controlled by a doctrine of comparative negligence
might, in the absence of an exact top limit on recoveries, award damages
for the entire injury to a negligent plaintiff, under the pretence that the
total of damages incurred was some indefinite higher amount. This difficulty would not arise in a case in which contribution was being enforced
between tortfeasors, because there the question of fact as to damages would
be the very simple one of calculating an exact fraction of an already determined total of damages paid or payable to a third person.
The substantive reasons given for the unwillingness of courts to aid
persons who were at fault in the transaction sued on may be summarized 19
under two heads:
(i) Such non-access to the courts operates to punish for past misconduct, and by the same token to discourage other prospective improper activity of the same type. Thus it is argued that parties contemplating the
execution of an illegal contract, knowing that the courts will neither enforce
it nor" compel any restitution of or reimbursement for the consideration
given under it, however unevenly the burden of it may, at the end, be distributed between the parties to it, will for that reason be deterred from entering into it in the first place. Likewise it is contended that the contributory
negligence rule induces people to be more careful to avoid impending injuries to their persons and property than they would be if the rule of comparative negligence were enforced. And it is urged that the rule of no
contribution causes all prospective tortfeasors, whether they contemplate
intentional or merely negligent wrongdoing, or even liability by respondeat
superior, to guard themselves a little more warily against participation with
others in acts which might produce liability in tort, because of a fear of
being compelled to pay the entire damages instead of a ratable share of them
only.2 0 An argument directly opposed to this would be entirely understandable. The fact that one joint tortfeasor may be held for the whole of the
damages arising from the tort of course means that the other tortfeasors
may go scot-free. This possibility of escaping all liability-a "sporting
chance" of a type traditionally appealing to wrongdoers as a class-might
cause many to be more willing rather than less willing to engage in the
=See Notes (1924)
szprg note 13, at 242.

22

MICH. L. REv. 831;

(1925)

34 YEI

L. J. 427.

Cf. Bohlen,

Cf. summary in WoODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS 213.

"The reason why the law refuses its aid to enforce contribution amongst wrongdoers,
is that they may be intimidated from committing the wrong, by the danger of each being
made responsible for all the consequences." Thweatt's Adm'r v. Jones, I Rand. 328 at 333
(Va. 1823). See also Avery v. Central Bank, 221 Mo. 71, 87, 119 S. W. IIO6 (I9O9);
Pierson v. Thompson, I Edw. Ch. 212, 218 (N. Y. 1831) ; Andrews v. Murray & Kane, 33
Barb. 354, 356 (N. Y. i861) ; I CooLEY, TORTS (3d ed. i9o6) 261.
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wrongful activity. Even if the opposite be true, and the no contribution
rule does have a deterrent effect, such an effect will in the nature of
things apply only to persons who directly contemplate the commission of
tortious acts. Where the joint activity was improper only because it was
negligent, it would frequently be true that no expectation either of injury
to another or liability to such other entered the minds of the joint tortfeasors. It is difficult to believe that the no contribution rule has ever had
much effect by way of making careless people careful; that a motorist, for
example, who cannot be deterred from negligence by fear of the physical
consequences of a collision will be much affected in his conduct by the legal
rule as to contribution between joint tortfeasors, assuming that he is acquainted with the rule. The truth of the matter seems to be that all along
the courts have been assuming something which they did not know. They
had the rule of no contribution between tortfeasors, and other related rules,
and inasmuch as these rules would be "well supported in principle" if they
served to deter people from participation in legally objectionable activity,
the courts proceeded to assume that they did have this deterrent effect, without any actual proof whatever of the fact. On the other hand, there has
been no proof that the rules do not have such a deterrent effect. It has
merely been guessed that they do not. But this guess seems at least as
intelligent as the old assumption otherwise, and perhaps a little more so.
Possibly a study of the "law in action" could reveal the truth, but so far no
such study has been made public. In the absence of such statistical information, it would seem wise to avoid broad assertions as to deterrent
effect, and seek elsewhere for reasons for the no contribution rule and its
fellows.
(2) The other reason given is that the courts have no time for, nor
interest in, disputes about transactions which flout the very law which the
courts are asked to administer. This sounds more like an epithet than a
reason. It states a dislike for a certain type of litigation, but it does not
say why such causes are not as deserving of decision as are any other kinds
of suit. For centuries our common law courts have been taking on an
increasing volume of work and wider areas of jurisdiction; the argument
against overworking the courts, though frequently heard, is not commonly
thought to be of sufficient weight to bar substantial causes from adjudication. And it is submitted that, apart from the supposed deterrent and
punitive effect discussed in the last paragraph, the only social interest served
by giving vent to the dislike for such litigants and their causes is a saving
of the judicial time and energy which would be expended in trying them.
Before the joint tortfeasor cases are analyzed in detail, the nature of
the remedy of contribution and the reasons for it should be examined. The
remedy had its origin in equity, but has long since been accepted at law
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also, 21 though there have been minor variations between its equitable and
legal forms.2 2 The most common case for contribution has been between
sureties on the obligation of another, and courts have said that the right to
contribution as between such sureties is contractual in nature, the theory
being that each surety on entering into the obligation agrees with every
other surety to contribute his share to whatever burden falls upon any of
them. 23 It is not of course contended by anyone that such an affirmative
consensual arrangement between the parties actually occurs; it is merely
assumed that they, tacitly, have accepted the rights and duties which the
law, for other reasons, has seen fit to assign them. These other reasons
are what is important. They can best be discovered from cases to which
the confusing language of implication of contract is least applicable. Incidentally, such cases are more comparable than others to the joint tortfeasor
situation.
It is well settled that contribution between sureties on the same obligation will be enforced even though they became sureties by entirely separate
undertakings at different times, and even unknown to each other.24 It is
not so well settled, but the decided weight of recent authority holds, that
where several principals have independently placed property in the hands
of one agent who validly, though without authority, pledges all the property
to another as security for the agent's own debt, some but not all of the property being taken by the pledgee in payment of the debt, the remaining property must be shared proportionately by all the principals. 25 This is true
' There are some early reports of contribution allowed "by the custom of the city" where
cases arose in large trading centers. Offley v. Johnson, 2 Leon. 166, p. 2o2 (K. B. 1584) ;
Layer v. Nelson, I Vein. 456 (Ch. 1687). Contribution was enforced as an equitable doctrine
almost as early, however, Fleetwood v. Charnock, Nels. io (Ch. 1629) ; and was not formally
taken over by the law courts for many years. See ARANT, SURETYSHIP (193i) 334; ARNOLD, op. cit. supra note I, at 262; KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTS (I893) 4oo; SPENCER, SURETYSHIP (1913) 200; STEARNS, SURETYSHIP (3d ed. r922) 473; WOODWARD, QUASI COXTRACTS 398; Anon., The Law of Contribution (1869) 8 Am. L. REa. (N. s.) 449. For a review of the English cases, see Wolmershausen v. Gullick [1893] 2 Ch. 514.
"'In law the amount of the contributive shares was determined by the total number
of persons originally liable to contribute, while in equity it was determined by the number
of contributors who were solvent and in the jurisdiction. Some cases at law held that the
liability to contribute did not survive against the estate of a decedent; equity allowed such
survival. There were other similar differences. In modern practice they have tended
to disappear, the equity rules being generally adopted by law. ARANT, SURETYSHIP 335;
ARNOLD, op. cit. stpra note I, at 264.
'Batard v. Hawes, 2 E. & B. 287 (Q. B. 1853); Chipman v. Morrill, 2o Cal. 130
(1862); Johnson v. Harvey, 84 N. Y. 363 (1881). See KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTS 4O;
WOODWARD, QUASI CoTRmcrS 399.
"Deering v. Earl Of Winchelsea, 2 Bos. & P. 270 (C. P. 1787) ; United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Naylor, 237 Fed. 314 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); Warner v. Morrison, 3 Allen 566
(Mass. 1862); Young v. Shunk, 3o Minn. 503, 16 N. W. 402 (1883). See ARNOLD, Op. Cit.
supra note I, at 268; 2 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS 2316; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS 401;
Note (1932) 76 A. L. R. 904.
IIn re Toole, 274 Fed. 337 (C. C. A. 2d, 192i) ; McBride v. Potter-Lovell Co., 169
Mass. 7, 47 N. E. 242 (1897); Vian v. Hilberg, 11 Neb. 232, 196 N. W. 153 (923);
Asylum of St. Vincent de Paul v. McGuire, 239 N. Y. 375, 146 N. E. 632 (1925); Vance
Lumber Co. v. Fraser, 162 Wash. 347, 298 Pac. 438 (193i). Contra: In re Mclntyre, i89
Fed. 46 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911); Johnson v. Bixby, 252 Fed. io3 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918). And
see Holahan, Contribution Among Securities Pledged by a Defaulting Stock Broker (i93o)
4 So. CAIF. L. R. I; Note (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 92; Note (i925) 38 A. L. R. i219.
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even though the property not taken is definitely identifiable as that of a
single principal. Nothing in the nature of a contract for contribution can
be spelled out in these cases, yet contribution is enforced. Likewise, if one
tenant in common makes necessary repairs on the commonly owned property or pays obligations resting upon it, he may demand contribution from
the other tenants in common.26 Corporate stockholders held under statutes
creating personal liability in them for debts of the corporation can compel
contribution from stockholders whose statutory liability was not directly
enforced.

27

The central feature of all these cases, as well as of the cases in which
contribution between joint tortfeasors is enforced, is the fact of common
liability for an obligation resting at law equally upon the property or persons
between whom there is contribution. The reasoning of the decisions and
of the commentators thereupon constantly falls back upon that fact, though
the forms of language used in referring to it are various. The maxim
"Equality is equity" appears probably in half the cases, whether in law or
equity.28 Some are satisfied with the statement that the doctrine rests upon
"the general principles of justice and equity" .29 or upon "the broad principles of natural justice".30 The more recent cases and writers nearly
always say expressly that the fact of common obligation is the important
thing.

"The reason .

.

. is because by such payment he has -relieved

them of a common burden and hence they ought to reimburse him for their
proportionate part of his loss." 31 "Equality of burden as well as of the
benefits is the basis for its recognition." 32 The term "unjust enrichment"
seldom, if ever, appears in the cases, but it seems obvious that the results
of the cases, and the reasons given for them, really fall within the area to
which writers on quasi contracts have given that name. The idea emphasized
is that each obligor should bear his part of the burden; and if one discharges
the burden of another, without being reimbursed, the other has gained a
financial advantage to which he is not equitably entitled. That is merely
another way of saying that the other would be unjustly enriched at the
Campbell v. Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch. 332 (N. Y. i82o) (repairs to party wall) ; Cocks
v. Simmons, 55 Ark. lO4, 17 S. W. 594 (x891) (taxes). See I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
(2d ed. i92o) 687; The Law of Contribution, supra note 21, at 456.
'Wolters v. Henningsan, 114 Cal. 433, 46 Pac. 277 (1896); Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio
St. 113 (1866).
See Lex v. Selway Steel Corp., 2o3 Iowa 792, 2o6 N. W. 586 (19z5);
STEARNS, SURETYSHIP 483.
' Quotation of this and other equitable principles in contribution cases on the law side

is attributable to the fact that law courts freely recognize the equitable origin and nature
of the remedy of contribution.
'SPENCER,

SURETYSHIP

200.

'Mitchell's Adm'r v. Sproul, 5 J. J. Marshall 264 at 270 (Ky. I83I), quoted in ARNOLD,
op. cit. supra note i, at 263.
"2

WILLISON, CONTRACTS 2317.

'2ARNOID op. cit. supra note I, at 270. See also Note (1925)
"any situation involving a common obligation."

35 YALE L. J.

92,

94:
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expense of the one who paid off the common obligation.3 3 Actually, it
seems not to make much difference what formal explanation is accepted,
so long as it is understood that the right to contribution is not necessarily
based on a voluntary consensual transaction between the parties. The
essential thing is the attempt to be fair as between persons subjected to a
3
common legal liability.

4

There are also social considerations favoring the allowance of contribution between persons who are under a liability that is joint and several
in nature. Foremost among these is the fact that a corrupting influence
tends to manifest itself in cases where contribution is not allowed. If those
subject to a common liability know that the whole obligation will have to
be discharged by those against whom the creditor chooses to enforce his
claim, and that the others will escape liability altogether, frequent attempts
to influence creditors in their selection of the unfortunate defendants will
be inevitable. 35 Direct bribery in the form of payments which the creditor
would receive over and above the total amount of his enforceable claim can
easily be understood in such cases, and other less tangible but equally
effective benefits and favoritisms could scarcely be avoided. There may be
differences of opinion as to the significance of such corruption, but its
reality as a result- of the no contribution rule cannot be denied. Another
social consideration should be presented as worthy of careful thought. At
least some private liabilities are imposed partly because they serve as
agencies for social control over the persons upon whom they are imposed,
inducing such persons to observe social obligations to their fellows. Known
opportunities to escape these liabilities, either by chance or collusion, may
' This fact has been pointed out by those who have approached the topic from the
point of view of the law of quasi contracts. ". . . the liability of the defendant rests upon
the principle that there would be an unjust enrichment on his part were he not compelled
to share in a burden which should have been borne by him as well as by the plaintiff."
KEENER, QUASI CoxTRAcTS 4o6. Also see Note (1925) 35 YAM L. J. 92, 98, referring to
cases such as those cited in note 25 .rupra: "The resulting increase in the value of the
property interest of those depositors whose securities have survived constitutes an unjust
enrichment which requires contribution to those at whose expense it was created." Cf.
WoooWAR,

QUAsI

CoNTRAcrS 401, where the position is taken that, though the right to

contribution is properly explainable on principles of unjust enrichment, the tendency of law
courts to speak of it as contractual has so confused the issue that it is difficult to say definitely what is its underlying basis. It is submitted, however, that the total absence of anything in the nature of a consensual arrangement in many of the cases in which contribution
is enforced renders the contract explanation so artificial that it is not entitled to serious consideration.
'It has been pointed out that much of the common law which jurists in the last century tried to explain in terms of contract or voluntary undertaking is really based upon rules
laid down by the law-making power without regard to the will of particular parties to litigation, such rules being laid down on the theory that they achieved fair and socially desirable results between litigants occupying somewhat standardized relational positions. See
POUND, SPIRIT OF THE COsOroN LAw (1921) 20-31. Also see ARNOLD, op. cit. supra note
I, at 271: "The relation of the parties must determine the right to demand contribution."
S'For cases of such collusion between a tort plaintiff and one of several joint tortfeasors, see infra note 52. Compare cases cited in note 53. It is common knowledge that such
undercover dealings occur constantly in personal injury cases involving joint tortfeasors,
though affirmative record of them seldom appears in the reported decisions.
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materially lessen their effectiveness as agencies for social control. A rule
of no contribution between persons subject to a common liability does afford
such an opportunity for escape.36
All these considerations seem as applicable to the problem of contribution between tortfeasors as to contribution between other classes of persons
subject to a common liability. As between the tortfeasors themselves, their
fault or lack of fault being in the eyes of the law approximately equal, the
fairness of contribution need not be argued. The theory of unjust enrichment fits the facts of the tortfeasor case as well as it fits those of any contribution case. One person has discharged a burden which both in law and
conscience was equally the liability of another; if contribution be not
allowed, the net assets of the other will be increased at the expense of the
one. If it be urged that there is no particular advantage to society in preventing this, on the theory that all social interests are cared for adequately
when the injured person has recovered from any or all tortfeasors, and that
the dispute between the tortfeasors is their own private concern purely, two
answers may be given. First, the dispute between the tortfeasors is no more
purely their private concern than is that between co-sureties, one of whom
has discharged the whole suretyship obligation, nor than that between any
of the others between whom the law enforces contribution. In all these
cases purely private claims are presented for adjudication. But the enforcement of private claims is the main business of the judicial system. And,
secondly, the point is based on a wholly mistaken assumption. Very substantial social interests which are served by enforcing contribution were
pointed out in the paragraph next before this.
In admiralty, the courts have felt free to develop their own rules uncontrolled by the common law decisions, with the result that they never
accepted either the doctrine of contributory negligence or the rule of no
contribution between negligent joint tortfeasors. Instead of the doctrine
of contributory negligence they adopted a system under which the injured
party and the injuring party, both negligent, are required to divide the total
loss between themselves equally. 3 7 Consistently, the admiralty courts have
'A line of reasoning directly opposed to this has been taken to support the rule denying contribution between joint tortfeasors. See supra note 2o, and accompanying text.
' The Max Morris, supra note I6; The Eugene F. Moran, 212 U. S. 466, 29 Sup. Ct.
339 (igog) ; Wood Towing Corp. v. Tomasos, 25 F. (2d) 395 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928). It has
been held in personal injury cases in admiralty that the loss need not be divided equally,
but may be apportioned according to fault. The Lackawanna, 15i Fed. 499 (S. D. N. Y.
I9O7), noted in (1907) 7 Coi. L. REV. 352. See HUGHES, ADmIIALTY (2d ed. 1920) 221.
Other maritime nations have adopted this rule for collisions also, but in American courts
an equal division is insisted upon, even though the parties were in unequal fault. The Marret, 3o F. (2d) 923 (C. C. A. 3d, 19"g) ; certioraridenied, Bull S. S. Co. v. Hudson, 279
S. 862, 49 Sup. Ct. 479 (1929). See Huger, The Proportional Damage Rule ia Collisions at Sea (1928) 13 Corny. L. Q. 531; Sprague, Divided Damages (1928) 6 N. Y. U.
L. REv. 15; Robinson, Legal Adjustments of Personal Injury in the Maritime Industry
(193o) 44 H- v. L. REv. 223, 235. The doctrine of comparative negligence has been enunciated, perhaps carelessly, in some common law courts. See Galena Ry. Co. v. Jacobs, 2o
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also refused to follow the no contribution rule in negligence cases. 8s It has
never been suggested that the rule in admiralty operates to induce more
collisions or other negligent injuries than occur under the common law
rules of contributory negligence and no contribution, or that it is substantially more difficult to administer.8 9
There has been a great deal of direct criticism of the common law rule
denying contribution between tortfeasors, 40 but practically all of it has been
against the rule as applied in negligence cases. Critics have apparently been
content to let the no contribution rule run its course where intentional tortfeasors are involved. It is easy to understand how the two supposed reasons
for the rule have been assumed to be more logically applicable to intentional
wrongdoers than to persons merely negligent, yet it is true that there is
absolutely no factual proof that the rule operates effectively as punishment
and discouragement to wrongdoers, or that the law's attitude of dignified
aloofness serves any good purpose whatever, whether the would-be litigant
be a double-dyed villain, or only an ordinary imprudent man. Be that as
it may, the conmon law is settled, and there seems no demand for a change
-there can be no non-contractual contribution between tortfeasors who
knew and intended the tortious consequences of their misconduct. 4 1 Some
Ill. 478 at 496 (1858).

And it has been adopted in a number of federal and state statutes

designed to cope with special situations, such as Employer's Liability. THRocK 0t ToN's
CooLEY ON Toitrs 644. For example see 35 STAT. 66 (908), 45 U. S. C. A. § 53 (928).

These statutes often provide for apportionment of damages according to fault, rather than
equal division of damages. For an extended study of the problem, see Mole & Wilson,
A Study of Comparative Negligence (1932) I7 CORN. L. Q. 333, 6o4.
'The Alabama v. The Gamecock, 92 U. S. 695 (1875) ; Erie R. R. Co. v. Erie Transp.
Co., 2o4 U. S. 220, 27 Sup. Ct. 246 (i9o7) ; Great Lakes Towing Co. v. Masaba S. S. Co.,
237 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 6th, i916) ; New York & Porto Rico S. S. Co. v. Lee's Lighters,
48 F. (2d) 372 (E. D. N. Y. i93o).

'Admiralty courts act without juries, the fact-finding agency being the judge himself, sometimes aided by appointed commissioners. See i Ba.xNEicr,
A tninMALTY (5th ed.
1925) § 405; HUGHES, ADmnRALTY 410. Possibly this makes for a simpler and surer administration of a doctrine of comparative negligence than would be possible in a court
sitting with a jury as the fact-finding body. It is suggested in the article by Mole & Wilson, supra note 37, that this should not be assumed, however. At any rate the point would
not be very important in contribution cases, since the most troublesome fact question involved in comparative negligence cases, that of assigning a proper amount of loss to be
borne by each party, would in contribution cases be quite simple. It would be determined
by calculating an exact fraction of an already determined total of damages. See supra
note 18, and accompanying text.
' 0Reath, supra note 3; Williams, The Rule in Merryweather v. Nixan (igoi) I7 L. Q.
RaV. 293; Quarles, Contribution Between Joint Tortfeasors (1917) 1 MARQUETrT L. REV.
141; Brown, ContributionBetween Joint Wrongdoers (1917) 85 CENT. L. J. 244; Gregory,
Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence (0932) 41 YALE L J. 831, 845;
Notes (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 527; (I924) 22 MIcH. L. REv. 831; (0928) 27 MicH. L. REv.
110; (I929) 27 MicH. L. Ray. 478; (0928) 76 U. oF PA. L. R v. 979; (I930) 34 DIxc.
L.
REV. 123; (i93o) i8 CA=. L. Rrv. 522; (1931) I6 MiNN. L. REV. 73; (1932) 32 CoL. L.
Rav. 94; and an especially well prepared note in (1931) 45 HARV. L. REv. 349. Cf. Notes
(1914) 1 VA. L. REV. 313; (1925) 34 YA.In L J. 427, reprinted in (925) 42 So. AFy. L. J.
184; (1931) 5 CIN. L. RFV. 339.
' Merryweather v. Nixan, supra note 6, at 186; Weld-Blundell v. Stephens,
[192o] A. C. 956; Rucker v. Allendorph, io2 Kans. 771, 172 Pac. 524 (1918) ; Alexander
v. Alexander, 154 Ky. 324, 157 S. W. 377 (1913) ; Johnson v. Torpy, 35 Neb. 604, 53

N. W. 575 (1892) ; s. c.i 43 Neb. 882, 62 N. W. 253 (1895) ; Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch.
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contain language broad enough to permit contribution between

such intentional wrongdoers, but it is possible that even these statutes will
be restricted by interpretation to exclude such cases.
In sharp contrast with the cases just mentioned is another group in
which contribution has apparently always been permissible--cases in which
two or more persons intentionally do an act which, by reason of their nonnegligent mistake of fact, they in good faith believe to be proper and lawful,
the act in fact being tortious as to third parties. Most of the cases in this
group involve attachments levied upon property which later turned out to be
exempt from attachment or owned by someone other than the judgment
debtor, thus subjecting the attaching creditors to tort actions for wrongful
levy of attachment. 43 In such cases, contribution between the wrongful attaching creditors is permitted, and it is generally deemed immaterial whether,
the attaching creditors acted in concert, or levied independently on the same
property.4 4 It has not been suggested that possible negligence of one or
both tortfeasors in not learning of the facts which rendered their acts
tortious would affect the holding as to contribution. The two reasons adduced for the rule denying contribution may well have been imagined to be
less applicable to this type of case than to cases of intended wrongdoing,
but there is no proof save in supposition that the respective holdings as to
contribution affect either class of tortfeasors one way or another. They
represent the common law as it now stands; that is all that can be said of
45
them.
The situation is not materially different where the tort liability of the
parties between whom contribution is sought is based on personal negligence
as distinguished from intended acts. The great weight of modern authority,
131 (N. Y. 1816) ; Davis v. Gelhaus, 44 Ohio St. 69, 4 N. E. 593 (1886) ; Fakes v. Price,
18 Okla. 413, 89 Pac. 1123 (19o7); Boyer v. Bolender, 129 Pa. 324, 18 Ati. 127 (1889);
National Surety Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., ig F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 2d,
1927); Ladd v. Ney, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 2Ol, 81 S. W. IOO7 (904); Turner v. Kirkwood,

49 F. (2d) 59o (C. C. A. loth, 1931). It has also been suggested that persons whose tort
liability is based on violation of a statute, irrespective of whether they knew they were
violating the statute or even knew of the statute's existence, are tarred black with the same
brush as are intentional wrongdoers, and can never get contribution. Nettles v. Alexander, 169 Ark. 38o, 275 S.W. 708 (1925) ; Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Christenson,
183 Minn. 182, 236 N. W. 618 (ig3i). See discussion of this point, infra note 64.
'Discussed infra note 66.
'Vandiver v. Pollak, 97 Ala. 467, 12 So. 473 (1893) ; s. c., 1o7 Ala. 547, 19 So. 18o
(1894) ; Farwell v. Becker, 129 Ill. 261, 21 N. E. 792 (1889) ; Selz, Schwab & Co. v. Guthman, 62 Ill. App. 624 (I896) ; First Natl. Bk. v. Avery, 69 Neb. 329, 95 N. W. 622 (19o3).
See also Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203 (1853), containing an oft-quoted dictum.
"Several of the cases cited in note 43 involved the latter set of facts. A contrary
holding which seems not to have been followed elsewhere appears in Paddock-Hawley Iron
Co. v. Rice, supra note 9.
'See also Central Bk. & Trust Co. v. Cohn, i5o Tenn. 375, 264 S.W. 641 (1924), in
which successive innocent converters of a promissory note were held entitled to contribution among themselves; Thweatt's Adm'r v. Jones, supra note 20; Jacobs v. Pollard, io
Cush. 287 (Mass. 1852); Eureka Coal Co. v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 219 Ala. 286, 122
So. 169 (1929).
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where it is unchanged by statute, denies any right to contribution. 46 But
contribution between negligent joint tortfeasors has been declared proper,
without the aid of statute, by the courts of at least three states-Wisconsin, 47 Pennsylvania 4' and Minnesota,4 9 and perhaps a fourth, Oregon,"'
and the House of Lords permits it in negligence cases arising from Scotland.5 These courts have for the most part been moved by the obvious
injustice, as between the two tortfeasors, of one bearing the whole loss while
the other goes free, when in fact one is neither more blameworthy nor more
free of blame than the other, the incidence of the burden being determined
by the accident of the recovering plaintiff's levy of execution, or even by
collusion between the recovering plaintiff and one of the defendants. 52 Close
analysis of the nature of the right to get contribution is not found in the
cases. They simply emphasize the equities apparent on the face of the
facts. Probably that is enough. A formulation of underlying principles
in terms of unjust enrichment can do little more.
It has also been held, in a jurisdiction not permitting contribution, that
one of two defendants against whom a tort judgment has been rendered
jointly could pay off the judgment through a straw man, take assignment
thereof in the name of the latter, and then enforce contribution from the
other defendant. 53 Such a decision indicates a certain lack of sympathy
for the no contribution rule, even when the court is technically required to
enforce it. A similar situation arises when, as is very often the case in
'Gulf & S. I. R. R. Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co., 26o Fed. 262 (S. D. Miss., 1919) ; Forsythe
v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 149 Cal. 569, 87 Pac. 24 (19o6) ; Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Swift
& Co., 23 Ga. App. 346, 98 S. E. 256 (1918) ; City of Louisville v. Louisville Ry. Co., 156
Ky. 141, i6o S. W. 771 (1913); Larkin Co. v. Terminal Warehouse Co., 161 App. Div. 262,
46 N. Y. Supp. 38o (914); aff'd, 221 N. Y. 707, T17 N. E. 1074 (917); Cain v. Quannah
Lt. & Ice Co., 131 Okla. 25, 267 Pac. 641 (1928) ; Spalding v. Administrator of Oakes, 42 Vt.
343 (1869) ; and cases cited infra note 63. Also see Thweatt's Adn'r v. Jones, spra note
20. The cases cited are merely typical ones, and do not by any means comprise an exhaustive list. There are literally hundreds of American cases to this effect. Most of the cases
involve attempts to secure indemnity as well as contribution.
'Ellis v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W. IO48 (1918); Mitchell
v. Raymond, supra note 9; Sattler v. Neiderkorn, 190 Wis. 464, 209 N. W. 607 (1926);
Wait v. Pierce, 19i Wis. 202, 2io N. W. 822 (1926); Roeber v. Pandl, 2oo Wis. 42o, 228
N. W. 5T2 (i93o) ; Haines v. Duffy, 2o6 Wis. 193, 240 N. W. 152 (i93I).
'Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218 (i87o); Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231 (1928).
'Underwriters at Lloyd's, etc. v. Smith, i66 Minn. 388, 2o8 N. W. 13 (1926) ; Duluth,
M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N. W. 766 (ig3i).
'See Furbeck v. I. Gevurtz & Son, 72 Ore. 12, 22, 143 Pac. 654 (1914).
Palmer v. Wick & Pulteneytown Ship. Co., Ltd. [1894] A. C. 318.
For a strikingly successful case of such collusion see Pennsylvania Co. v. Western
Penn. Rys. Co., nio Ohio St. 516, 144 N. E. 51 (i924). Also see Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Beskin, 140 Va. 744, 125 S. E. 678 (I924).
'Gale Lumber Co. v. Bush, 227 Mass. 203, i16 N. E. 48o (197), the court saying:
"A motive to use legal means to make joint tortfeasors contribute to a payment of damages flowing from a wrong in which they have participated contravenes no policy of the
law." This attitude is not general, however. Most courts denying contribution would do
so despite the intervention of a strawman. Lillie v. Dennert, 232 Fed. 104 (C. C. A. 6th,
1916): Manowitz v. Kanov, I7 N. J. L. 523, i54 Atl. 621 (I931).
See Note (I93I) 75
A. L. R. 1468.
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modern times, one of the joint tortfeasors is represented by a casualty insurance company or a surety on an appeal bond who pays off the entire
judgment and then seeks contribution of ratable shares from the other
tortfeasors and their insurers or sureties. On these facts, the New York
courts, while denying contribution between the tortfeasors themselves, decided that a surety occupied a different position, was not tarred with the
black of the principal's wrongdoing, and would be subrogated, as purchaser
of the judgment, to the original judgment creditor's rights. 54 Most jurisdictions, however, have taken the opposite view, and have treated the insurer or surety exactly the same as his principal. This has been done both
in jurisdictions which deny contribution between the tortfeasors themselves " and those in which contribution is allowed. 6 It is scarcely possible to imagine how the no contribution rule applied between casualty insurance companies will deter any prospective joint tortfeasors from their
misconduct. There may be some valid question, however, as to whether
such sureties should be given greater rights than their principals enjoy; 5T
such partial, palliative relief might postpone indefinitely the more complete
relief which must take the form of abandonment of the no contribution rule
altogether.
Closely related to the cases referred to in the last paragraph are those
in which two or more persons are liable by respondeat superior for the acts
of a joint employee or representative. Contribution between the persons
thus subjected to liability without fault has generally been permitted. 5s It
would seem that the holding must necessarily be the same where two or
more persons, as joint owners or occupiers of property, are subjected to an
absolute liability without fault under the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher' 9
" Kolb v. National Surety Co., 176 N. Y. 233, 68 N. E. 247 (1903); City of White
Plains v. Ellis, 113 Misc. ., 184 N. Y. Supp. 444 (ig2o). New York has since by statute
changed its law, and permits contribution between joint tortfeasors. See infra note 66.
0 Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 Pac. 389 (i921)

(cf. Salter v. Lom-

bardi, 116 Cal. App. 9I1, 3 P. (2d) 38 (1931)); United States Cas. Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0.
& T. P. Ry. Co., 218 Ky. 455, 291 S. W. 709 (1927) ; Fiorentino v. Adkins, 9 N. J. Misc.
446, 154 Atl. 429 (193:); Royal Indem. Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N. E. 194
(1930) ; Cain v. Quannah Lt. & Ice Co., supra note 46. Also see National Surety Co. v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., supra note 41 (intentional wrongdoers); Note (193i)
75 A. L. R. 1486.
'Underwriters at Lloyd's, etc. v. Smith, supra note 49; Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher
Co., mipra note 48. See also Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Christenson, supra note 41
(contribution denied for special reasons) ; Boyer v. Bolender, supra note 41 (contribution
denied because wrongdoing intentional rather than negligent).
"See Note (1921) 5 MiNi. L. REv. 37o. Cf. (931) 79 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 507.
Wooley v. Batte, 2 C. & P. 417 (1826) ; Bailey v. Bussing, supra note 3; Farney v.
Hauser, iog Kan. 75, 198 Pac. 178 (i92I); Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 At. 815
(ii8); Ankenny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N. W. 320 (1887); Horbach's Adm'r v.
Elder, i8 Pa. 33 (i851). Cmtra: Pearson v. Skelton, I M. & W. 504 (Ex. 1836) (but here
there was a partnership fund out of which losses were expressly payable) ; Curtis v. Welker,
54 App. D. C. 272, 296 Fed. IOI9 (1924). Cf. Smith v. Ayrault, 71 Mich. 475, 39 N. W. 724
(1888).
59
6L. R. 3 H. L 330 (1868); also, see Bohlen, Ruic in Rylands v. Fletcher (1gi1)
U. OF PA. L. REv. 298, 373, 423.
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for injuries arising from the dangerous nature of the property. This conclusion at least receives some support from one decision.6 0 In neither case
is there anything in the nature of intentional wrongdoing or even negligence
on the part of the so-called joint tortfeasors between whom contribution is
sought, and their original liabilities were equally based on a single mutual
relationship to the person or thing actually producing the harm to third
parties.
It is difficult to see any essential difference between the cases just dealt
with and those in which contribution is sought between previously unconnected principals liable under the rule of respondeat superior for injuries
produced by the concurrent but not concerted acts of their respective agents.
If complete absence of any wrongdoing state of mind in the persons jointly
liable for the tort were the test, contribution would be permitted between
such principals. The fact that they did not, through their agents, act in
concert, but rather by independent operations which happened to take effect
at the same time and place, has not kept the law from treating them as joint
tortfeasors. They are jointly and severally liable to injured persons, just
as much as if their agents had acted in concert, and they are subjected to
all the other rules of law applied to joint tortfeasors. 6 ' No difference lies
in that quarter. Yet no case has been found in which it is even suggested
that separate principals of independently wrongdoing agents should be subject to contribution the same as joint principals for a single wrongdoing
agent, or be treated in any respect otherwise than as personally wrongdoing
tortfeasors are treated.62 This fact clearly indicates that after the no contribution rule made its beginning in the law it developed without much regard for the so-called reasons that have been enunciated in support of it.
It cannot reasonably be argued, much less proved, that the no contribution
rule has any deterrent effect at all upon principals whose tort liability exists
by respondeat superior alone, and judicial distaste for the type of claim
presented seems altogether unreasonable. Yet in modern practice such
litigants are plaintiffs in a very large proportion of the tort cases in which
contribution is or might be asked for, and in nearly all common law states
63
contribution is denied them.

"Ankeny v. Moffett, supra note 58.
, Supra note 9.
This possibility is suggested in a note in (i93o) 34 Dicx. L.

REv. 123 as an explanation of the case of Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., supra note 48, but that case actually
went on the broader ground that contribution between negligent tortfeasors was permissible.

"Union Stockyards of Omaha v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 196 U. S. 217, 25 Sup.

Ct. 226 (i9o5) ; Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Macon Ry. & Lt. Co., 9 Ga. App. 628, 71 S. E.
1o76 (19i1); Illinois C. R. R. Co. v. Louisville Bridge Co., I1 Ky. 445, i88 S. W. 476
(1916) ; Detroit Ry. Co. v. Boomer, 194 Mich. 52, i6o N. W. 542 (1916) ; Public Serv. Ry.
Co. v. Mateucci, io5 N. J. L. 114, 143 Atl. 22i (1928); rev'd 6 N. J. Misc. 34, 14o Atl. 44
(1928); Taylor v. Jones Constr. Co., ig5 N. C. 30, 141 S. E. 492 01928); Norfolk So. Ry.
Co. v. Beskin, supra note 52; Alaska Pac. S. S. Co. v. Sperry Flour Co., io7 Wash. 545,
182 Pac. 634, 185 Pac. 583 (i919); s. c., 122 Wash. 642, 211 Pac. 761 (1922).
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In the few states permitting contribution as a common law matter, the
right has apparently been limited to cases in which there .was no intentional
commission of tort. By way of extension of this limitation it has been
decided that if a tortfeasor's misconduct took the form of violation of a
statute, he will be barred from the right to contribution given to negligent
tortfeasors, even though the violated statute was one that purported to do
no more than set up a standard of conduct for traffic safety.64 Most of such
enactments are intended to set up statutory standards of due care under the
specified circumstances, concrete rules as to what amounts to negligence.
Violations will as often be the result of inadvertence as of deliberate choice.
One who violates these statutes and in doing so causes injury to another
is usually deemed guilty of negligence only; he is not treated as an intentional tortfeasor. In most American states today such statutes control
almost every aspect of the process of driving an automobile along a public
highway. Probably a large percentage of the cases in which contribution
has been allowed between negligent tortfeasors 65 were cases in which some
violation of statute was included in the negligence charged against them,
without any suggestion that it made any difference as far as the right to
contribution was concerned. It would seem unfortunate to eliminate all
possibility of contribution in such a considerable body of torts cases.
One fourth of the American states have shown their distaste for the
no contribution rule by enacting statutes, for the most part in recent years,
eliminating the old rule in whole or in part.6 6 It is to be feared, however,
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Christenson, supra note 41 (roadside parking at
night without taillight burning), noted in (1932) 3o MICH. L. REV. 8o4; (1932) 27 IL. L.
REv. 78. Also see Nettles v. Alexander, supra note 41.
1 Supra notes 47, 48 and 49.
Twelve states have statutes under which contribution between joint torfeasors is permitted to varying extents and under differing circumstances. The statutes in nine states
are fairly broad, allowing contribution in most negligence cases under usual procedural
conditions. Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 193o) §484a (enacted in 1926) ; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby,
Supp. 1929) art. 5o, § i2a (enacted in 1927); Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3268 (enacted in
1855) ; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) §§ 76-1Ol (enacted 1882); N. Y. CIV. PRAct.
§ 618 (enacted in 1929); TEXAS REV. Civ.
Acr (1928) § 2IIa; N. C. CODE AxN. (931)
CODE (Vernon, 1928) § 2212 (enacted 1917) ; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) § 5779 (first
written into enacted code of 1919, to clarify law) ; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 55, art. 7, § 13
(enacted 1873). A chief difficulty with most of these enactments is that they permit contribution only between tortfeasors against whom joint judgment has been rendered. See
statutes of Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Texas, and West Virginia, supra.
And these statutes have not changed the well settled common law rule that one injured by
joint tortfeasors may sue any or all of them, severally or jointly, as he pleases. See (193o)
39 YALE L. J. gog; (1931) 16 CoRN'. L. Q. 246. The result obviously is that these statutes
allow contribution only between those of the joint tortfeasors, if any, whom the injured
person has in his own untrammeled discretion chosen to sue jointly. The reasons for allowing contribution apply just as strongly to the other cases as to these. Texas has permitted
a joint tortfeasor sued singly to implead the others, thus bringing his case within the contribution statute. Lottman v. Cuilla, 288 S. W. 123 (Tex. Com. App., 1926), noted in
(1928) 6 TEx. L. REV. 554. Under a separate interpleader statute, intermediate New York
courts have held both ways, but the Court of Appeals, in Fox v. Western N. Y. Motor
Lines, 257 N. Y. 3o5, 178 N. E. 289 (I93I), concluded that the two statutes did not go far
enough to create this new right to implead. See also Ward v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 258 N. Y.
And see Note (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 94. The Kentucky, North
124, 179 N. E. 317 (1932).
Carolina, and Virginia statutes apparently allow contribution regardless of the nature of thc
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that most of these statutes were drawn hurriedly, and the absence of express
reference in them to many of the problems bound to arise under them has
caused considerable difficulty in their application. Such defects can easily
be eliminated in future enactments. A statute undertaking to avoid them
is suggested herewith. An alternative first section defining the area within
which contribution is to be allowed is presented.
Section i. Contribution between tortfeasors shall be permitted
in all cases where there is joint liability for a tort, whether such tort
was intended or unintended by the tortfeasors, the result of concerted
or unconcerted action by them, successive or concurrent in time, or
otherwise, except that this section shall not apply to cases in which by
law one of them is entitled to indemnity against the other.
Alternative Section i. Contribution between tortfeasors shall be
permitted in all cases where there is joint liability for a tort, whether
such tort was the result of concerted or unconcerted action by the tortfeasors, successive or concurrent in time, or otherwise, except that the
right to contribution shall not exist in favor of a tortfeasor who in
committing the tortious act intended to commit a tort. This section
shall not apply to cases in which by law one of the tortfeasors is entitled to indemnity against the other.
Section 2. Contribution between tortfeasors may be enforced in
any action brought against them for the tort, and if any tortfeasor subject to a liability for contribution is not a party to such action he may
be impleaded and made a party thereto on the complaint of the party
or parties who may have a claim for contribution against him. Such
tortfeasors claiming contribution against each other shall be treated
injured person's judgment, the North Carolina enactment being clearest on this point. Another uncertainty in several of the statutes arises from the fact that they would seem to
allow contribution between all tortfeasors, even those guilty of intentional wrongdoing. See
statutes of Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Texas and West
Virginia, .supra. It has been suggested that these statutes might nevertheless be interpreted
as applicable only to negligent or unintended wrongs, (i931) 16 CORN. L, Q. 246; though
it is difficult to discover any good reason for such limited interpretation. Two of the statutes, those of Kentucky and Virginia, expressly limit the right of contribution to cases
"where the wrong is a mere act of negligence, and involves no moral turpitude", terminology open to widely varying interpretations. It is altogether clear that these statutes would
be more useful if drawn only after careful consideration of the problems which will arise
under them.
The other three states in which contribution is achieved by statute are Kansas, Michigan and Georgia. In Kansas, the result was reached under a procedural statute (KAX.
REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) §60-3437) permitting one judgment debtor paying more than
his share of a joint judgment to enforce contribution from the other judgment debtors.
City of Fort Scott v. Kansas City, F. S. & M. R. Co., 66 Kan. 6IO, 72 Pac. 238 (Igo3).
Several other states have similar statutes, but none of them have been held to have the
substantive effect of changing the common law rule of no contribution between tortfeasors.
For a typical holding, see Forsythe v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., supra note 46. The Michigan
statute (MIcH. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 14497; enacted in 1911) for some odd reason permits
contribution in libel cases only. It appears to be one of the all-too-frequent instances of a
legislator writing a statute to fit one particular case, wholly regardless of the general problem involved. And the Georgia statute (GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §§4512-13; enacted in i861 code) applies only to "joint trespassers". That the term "trespassers" does
not include all "tortfeasors", as it might, seems settled in Georgia. See McCalla v. Shaw,
72 Ga. 458 (1884) ; Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Swift & Co., supra note 46.
A good review of all the contribution statutes here discussed appears in Note (i93i)
45 HARv. L. REv. 369.
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as adverse parties in the action, with the right to appeal against each
other and all other procedural rights allowed by law to adverse parties
in actions, save that the controversy between the tortfeasors shall not
delay a judgment to which the party suing for the tort is entitled, nor
execution thereupon, unless the court otherwise directs. If the claim
to contribution be not adjudicated in such first action, any tortfeasor
who either after judgment or on voluntary settlement has paid more
than his pro rata share of damages for the tort may enforce his claim
to contribution by a separate action. The pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be ascertained by dividing the total of damages properly
collected on account of the tort by the number of tortfeasors jointly
liable for the tort, and this pro rata share shall be the whole amount to
which any tortfeasors shall be entitled as contribution from any other
tortfeasor.
In most jurisdictions enactments such as this represent practically the
only available hope for getting rid of the no contribution rule, inasmuch
as repeated decisions have intrenched it so firmly that it cannot readily be
dislodged even by the most courageous and intelligent courts. In the jurisdictions in which the issue remains open, it is possible that the courts will
forestall any necessity for legislative action by following the lead of Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota in outright rejection of what appears
to be a thoroughly unfortunate and valueless rule of law. Contribution
should at least be allowed between tortfeasors who did not intend that their
misconduct should produce harmful consequences.
Indemnity
The idea of indemnity 67 implies a primary or basic liability in one
person, though a second person is also for some reason liable with the first,
or even without the first, to a third person. Discharge of the obligation by
the second person leaves him with a right to secure compensation from the
one who, as between themselves, is primarily liable. The right to indemnity
may arise from a contract, as in the case of casualty insurance, or warranty
of the quality of goods sold and their fitness for some proposed use to be
made of them, or agreement to hold harmless one who contemplates a
given course of action, or the like. With such cases of contract for indemnity we are not now concerned. Other types of the right to indemnity
are commonly called quasi contractual, or arising out of a "contract implied
by law". Indemnity between persons liable for a tort falls within this type
of case. As between such persons, the obligation to indemnify is not a

I There is a very close connection between the legal rules as to contribution between
tortfeasors, and indemnity between them, but this very fact has often led to a confusing failure to distinguish between the two. In this article, an attempt has been made to avoid that
confusion by discussing the problem of contribution without reference to that of indemnity,
the relationship between the two problems being brought out in the latter part of the paper,
which deals primarily with indemnity.
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consensual one; it is based altogether upon the law's notion-influenced by
an equitable background-of what is fair and proper between the parties.
It is true that the relationship of the parties, which often affords the decisive
clue as to what is fair between them, may have arisen by contract, though
it need not have. But in these cases the contract does not create the right
to indemnity. It only creates a part of the fact situation, and it is the fact
situation in its entirety, consensual and non-consensual elements both included, which gives rise to the obligation to indemnify. The quasi contractual idea of unjust enrichment of course underlies any holding that one
who has been compelled in discharging his own legal obligation to pay off
a claim which in fairness and good conscience should be paid by another
can secure reimbursement from that other.6 But in tort indemnity cases,
the leading facts are apt to be acts and relationships out of which tort liabilities have arisen, and it will often follow from this that the question of
unjust enrichment involved in the granting of indemnity will have to be
decided on substantially the same principles as those which controlled the
creation of the original tort liability.
I
In the law of torts the clearest situation for indemnity is that in which
the improper act of one person produces injury, and the law permits the
injured person to recover for his injury from someone other than the actor.
In such case the actor, or possibly someone standing in his stead, must
indemnify the one who has been held liable without fault, and by operation
of law only, for the actor's misconduct. This brings into close contact, and
at the same time into sharp contrast, two leading principles in the law of
torts-that of liability for fault alone, and that of absolute liability, or
liability without fault. Much of the law of torts is built around an idea
of fault. One who is guilty of injurious misconduct, either intentional or
negligent, is liable therefor. Of course there are cases of recognizable
misconduct causing harm to others for which the law has provided no
remedy, but those cases do not affect the immediate point. The idea is that
liability in tort cases follows directly from bad conduct. But along with
this idea grew up doctrines such as that of respo-ndeat superior and that
represented by the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,69 doctrines wholly inconsistent with the idea of liability for fault alone, and sometimes bitterly
opposed for that reason. 70 Explanations of respondeat superior designed
to show that it was in keeping with standard ideas of liability for fault were
attempted. These explanations may or may not have influenced courts in
-KEENER,
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396,

409.

-Supra note 59.
0 See, e. g., BATE, VicAmous LmiAHmTy (1916) 146-154. For a short summary of
attitudes on the problem, see PoUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Ig22) 166.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

their acceptance of the doctrine-we do not know. But we do know that
such explanations were artificial, that they do not describe what actually
happens when respondeat superior is applied, and that the fact of what does
actually happen when the doctrine is applied has been sufficient to induce
its retention and growth as a part of the law, regardless of explanations.
The doctrine of respondeat superior and its fellow doctrines, both statutory
and common law, imposing liability irrespective of fault, have operated as
a sort of social insurance, lifting the burden of loss off the innocent individual upon whom it happened to fall, and shifting it onto another innocent
person who normally has some opportunity to spread it over a portion of
society as a whole by adding it to the total cost of production or risk of
ownership in the area of social activity out of which the injury arose. Of
course there are many individual cases in which this spreading of the loss
is impossible, but usually that will mean that the benefit of the activity out
of which the injury arose is not one which inures to a considerable social
group, but rather solely to the innocent person forced to pay. In either
case, the one sponsoring the activity must bear the loss arising out of it,
rather than leave the loss on an innocent person unconnected with the
activity. At least the former is usually in a better position to pass on the
loss to those who may fairly be called on to bear it than is the latter of the
two innocents.
Obviously, any doctrine that shifts loss to an innocent person is going
to be regarded as a harsh doctrine, one not to be unduly extended. That
has been true. Furthermore, the harshness will be minimized as far as
possible by such secondary relief as other relevant rules of law can afford.
This is the point at which the contact between liability without fault and
liability for fault occurs. One whom the law holds to an absolute liability
for the wrongful act of another has been injured just as really, even though
indirectly, by that wrongful act as though his property had been struck by
the other's automobile in the first place. Even though we may properly
refer to the right to indemnity in such circumstances as a quasi contractual
right based upon unjust enrichment, it is actually supported by simple,
fundamental tort law principles just as clearly as is the right to recover for
injuries caused directly by the tortious act. Such indemnity is an imposition of liability for fault, and as such is designed to minimize the harshness
of previously imposed liability without fault.
Not much space need be spent in listing cases in which one held liable
without personal fault for a tortious act can recover indemnity from the
real tortfeasor. One held by respondeat superior for the torts of his agent
or servant can get indemnity from the latter. 71 On its face the situation
" Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (i875) ; Georgia, So. & Fla. Ry. v. Jossey, 105 Ga. 271,
31 S. E. I7 (1898) ; Costa v. Yoachim, 1o4 La. 170, 28 So. 92 (1900) ; Grand Trunk Ry.
Co. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874) ; Hill v. Murphy, 212 Mass. i, 98 N. E. 781 (i9i2);
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created by a Workmen's Compensation statute is similar. An employer
required to compensate a servant for an injury caused by a third person
would seem to have a right to indemnity against the third person. But it
has been held that the right given to a workman by a Compensation Act
is not in lieu of his tort right against third persons, but additional thereto,
leaving the whole right against the third person to the injured workman,
and subrogating the employer to none of it.7 2 More recent decisions, however, have been controlled either expressly or impliedly by a right to such
subrogation arising from the compensation statute itself. 73

Insofar as

this right is one created by the statutes, cases enforcing it shed no light on
the present problem. Situations which are in point, however, include that
in which an initial carrier has been held liable to the shipper for the loss of
goods shipped but is permitted indemnity against the connecting carrier
whose negligence actually caused the loss, 74 or in which a carrier thus held
liable can recover over from the one whose negligence produced the defective condition in the carrier's equipment which caused the injury to the
goods, 73 and that in which an employer held for an injury to an employee
on the theory of violation of the non-delegable common law duty to furnish
a safe place to work can have indemnity from the one whose negligence
rendered the working conditions unsafe.7 6 Perhaps the most common cases
of all those coming under this head are the ones in which a municipal corFedden v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 204 App. Div. 74i, i99 N. Y. Supp. 9 (ig23);
Gaffner v. Johnson, 39 Wash. 437, 8i Pac. 859 (i9o5). And see Ohio Valley Bk. v. Greenebaum Sons Bk. & Tr. Co., ii F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926). It is obvious that on similar
facts the servant can get neither contribution nor indemnity from the employer. Rumpf v.
Callo, i6 La. App. 12, 132 So. 763 (i93i). And see Tomerlin v. Krause, 278 S. W. 5o
(Tex. Civ. App. I926).
" Interstate T. & T. Co. v. Public Service Elec. Co., 86 N. J. L. 26, 90 Atl. io62
And see (i918) i8 CoL. L. R. 598. This rule was supposed to be in keeping with
(914).
the rule in life and accident insurance cases that the insurer is not subrogated to rights
of the insured or his estate against third persons causing death or injury of the insured.
Such subrogation is permitted in property and indemnity insurance cases. See VANcE, INSURANCE (2d ed. I93O) 668. The Workmen's Compensation situation seems different from
that in life insurance cases in that by the former there is a statutorily imposed absolute
liability on the employer to indemnify for injuries, whereas life insurance is by voluntary
contract representing more of investment than of indemnity. Incidentally, it might well
be argued that accident insurance has more of the indemnity features of property insurance
than of the investment features of life insurance, and that subrogation should be permitted
as to it also.

'See I SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION LAW (Ig2i) i91-202; BRADBURY,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (3d ed. 1917) 1186-92; HILL & WILSON, WoRK EN'S CoL!PENSATION STATUTE LAW (1923) §xii (summarizing all state statutes). Recent holdings

are listed in Notes (922) i9 A. L. R. 766; (1923) 27 A. L. R. 493; (925) 37 A. L. R.
838; (1925) 37 A. L. R. 853; (I93O) 67 A. L. R. 249.
Produce Trad. Co. v. Norfolk S. R. R. Co., 178 N. C. 175, IOO S. E. 316 (i919);
Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Eastin & Knox, ioo Tex. 556, io2 S. W. io5 (1907).
Bethlehem Shipbldg. Co. v. J. Gutradt Co., io F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
'"Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., i5i La. 41, 91 So. 539 (92). And
see Standard Oil Co. v. Robins Dry Dock & Rep. Co., 32 F. (2d) 182 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929);
Mallory S. S. Co. v. Druhan, i7 Ala. App. 365, 84 So. 874 (i92o) ; Busch & Latta Painting
Co. v. Woermann Constr. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276 S. W. 614 (i925). It should be noted that
in many of these cases negligence is attributable to the employer, from his failure to discover and remedy-the unsafe condition. The cases will be discussed from that point of view
later in this article.
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poration is held liable to a person injured by defects in a highway, sidewalk,
or other product of municipal activity for public use, and is then allowed
to secure reimbursement from the parties who created the defect.77 Almost
identical with the municipal corporation cases are those in which an occupier of premises is held liable for injuries arising from dangerous conditions thereon, but can recover over from the one who unknown to him
created the dangerous condition, 78 and those in which the owner of leased
premises is held to the same liability, but can recover over from the lessee
in possession.7" Various other situations could be recalled in which one
held liable without fault by operation of law can recover over from the one
whose fault actually produced the injury, 0 but enough have been given to
illustrate the principle adequately, and to point out the direction of its
application and growth. This sort of liability regardless of personal fault
seems to be extending itself in our law, both through legislative enactment
and judicial decision, and as it extends itself there will tend to be an
equivalent extension of rights to indemnity, arising from an attempt to
allocate ultimate loss according to more orthodox principles of tort law,
principles which will still be alive and active despite the attempt to distribute
immediate losses quickly on some more socialized theory.
II
Very closely related to the absolute liability cases just dealt with is
another, smaller group of cases, in which it is held that one voluntarily but
innocently and in good faith doing at the direction of another person an
act which on its face appears lawful and proper, but which is in fact tortious,
will be given indemnity against the one causing him to do the act. A
typical situation occurs when a creditor or his attorney directs a peace officer
' 7 Fort Scott v. Penn Lubric Oil Co., i2 Kan. 369, 252 Pac. 268 (1927) ; Chesapeake
& Ohio Canal Co. v. Allegheny County, 57 Md. 2oi (i88i); Township of Hart v. Noret,
191 Mich. 427, i58 N. W. 17 (i916). And see Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of
Columbia, 161 U. S. 316, i6 Sup. Ct. 564 (I896); 4 DiLoN, MuNicIPAL CotpoRATioNs (5th
ed. 19H) 3032. Frequently, also, the municipal corporation is itself deemed guilty of negligence, from its failure to discover and remedy the defect. Such cases will be discussed
later in this paper.
'Westfield Gas & Mill. Co. v. Noblesville & E. Gravel Rd. Co., 13 Ind. App. 481, 41
N. E. 955 (I895); Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., i4 Mass. 149 (1873); Churchill v. Holt,
127 Mass. i65 (i879). And see Ga. Power Co. v. Banning Cotton Mills, 42 Ga. App. 671,
157 S. E. 525 (i93i).
Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N. Y. 461, 31
N. E. 987 (1892), And see Miller v. New York Oil Co., 34 Wyo. 272, 243 Pac. x18 (1926).
Many of the lessor-lessee cases involve express agreements by the lessee to maintain repairs and hold the lessor harmless for failure to do so. In such cases, the covenant being
a valid one and not against public policy, it controls as a contract, and quasi contract or
tort principles are not relevant. See Trego v. Rubovitz, 178 Ill. App. 127 (913); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Capital City Surety Co., 224 App. Div. 553, 231 N. Y. Supp. 494
(1928).

" See Sutton v. Champagne, 41 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (917), in which plaintiff who had
been held under a statute making a parent liable for the torts of his minor child was given
indemnity against one whose negligence was the proximate cause of the child's commission
of the tort. For summary of cases see Notes (1912) 4o L. R. A. (N. s.) 1147, II53, ii65,
1172.
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to levy an attachment upon certain goods as those of a debtor, the goods
are in fact not subject to the levy, and the officer is compelled to pay damages for the wrongful attachment. The officer can recover over from the
one directing him to levy the attachment.8 1 The same is true if an agent
is thus induced to convert the goods of another by any other acts,8 2 or to

trespass upon realty, 8 3 or to commit any other tort whatever.8 4 The right
to indemnity exists even though the one directing the act to be done be as
innocent as the actor,8 5 on the theory that, as between the two, the one
ordering the act done, presumably for his own benefit, should take the responsibility for its legality. This theory often induces courts to talk about
an "implied contract" to indemnify under such circumstances, 8 6 but the
relief is actually given entirely apart from any discoverable contract. Of
course, there often will be an express contract to indemnify the one doing
the act; in such case the right is measured by the contract,8 7 assuming the
contract to be a valid one not against public policy, and the results are not
particularly helpful in a study of non-contractual indemnity.
III
Another group of cases in which indemnity is allowed has its origin
in what is known as the last clear chance doctrine, an aspect of the law of
contributory negligence. What is meant by the doctrine of the last clear
chance, 8s sometimes called the doctrine of discovered peril, is well enough
known; it is to the effect that if a plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence
is harmed by a negligent defendant, the plaintiff can still recover for the
injury if as between the two the defendant had the "last clear chance" to
prevent it. In some jurisdictions this last clear chance must have been one
perceived by the defendant in time for him to prevent the injury, else the
"Higgins v. Russo, 72 Conn. 238, 43 Atl. 1050 (1899); Selz, Schwab & Co. v. Guthman, supra note 43; Gower v. Emery, 18 Me. 79 (1841).
"Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66 (C. P. 1827) ; Betts v. Gibbons, 2 A. & E. 57 (K. B.

1834); Hoggan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 Pac. 512 (1903).
'Horrabin v. Des Moines, 198 Iowa 549, i99 N. W. 988 (i924).
"Howe v. Buffalo, N. Y. & E. RR. Co., 37 N. Y. 297 (1867) (wrongful expulsion of
railway passenger by conductor); Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah in9, 44 Pac. 833 (1896)
(wrongful institution of legal proceedings). See also STORY, AGENCY (9th ed. 1880 § 339;
MECHEM, OUTuNES OF AGENCY (3d ed. 1923) 269. It should be borne in mind, however,
that if the one doing the act goes beyond his instructions in doing it, so that he may be
said to have acted on his own initiative, he will have no claim to indemnity. Nelson v.
The
Cook, 17 Ill. 443 (i8s6); Russell v. Walker, i5o Mass. 531, 23 N. E. 383 (890).
CAL. CIV.

CODE

(Deering, 1923) § 1969, provides that an employer directing his servant

to do an unlawful act must indemnify him for liabilities therefor, unless the servant at the
time of obeying the directions believed them to be unlawful. The same provision appears
in N. D. Colip. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 61o6 and S. D. CoMP. LAWS (i29) § I072.
I Culner v. Wilson, supra note 84; MECHEM, 10c. cit. supra note 84.
e Sheffield Corp. v. Barclay, [I9o5] A. C. 392; Higgins v. Russo, supra note 81. Cf.
Atkins v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 78 (i87o).
87Coventry v. Barton, i7 Johns. 142 (N. Y. i819) ; Davis v. Arledge, 3 Hill 170 (S. C.
i6THROCKMORTON'S COOLEY ON TORTS 648; CT.RK & LINDSELL. TORTS 457; SALMOND,
TORTS 41. See Bohlen, The Rile in British Columbia Ry. Co. v. Loach (917) 66 U. or
PA. L. Ray. 73; Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 493.
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ordinary rule of contributory negligence will bar the plaintiff from relief;
in other jurisdictions it is enough that the defendant did have the last clear
chance and should have known that he had it. There are some jurisdictions
which do not accept the last clear chance doctrine at all, and there are others
which go beyond it, applying what is called a "humanitarian doctrine" the
effect of which is to shift the whole loss in almost every case of certain
types, regardless of contributory negligence. For present purposes it is
enough to assume that the doctrine is accepted as law in whatever form
happens to be agreeable to the particular jurisdiction.
The indemnity situation arising from the last clear chance rule is
fairly presented by the leading case, Nashua Iron & Steel Co. v. Worcester
& N. R. R. Co.s9 The declaration set out that due to defendant's negligence
the plaintiff's horse was frightened, and ran over and injured one Clapp,
who sued the plaintiffs, recovering judgment and satisfaction thereof, wherefore plaintiffs asked indemnity. Defendant demurred. The court assumed
facts possible under the declaration, to wit, that though plaintiffs negligently
mismanaged the horse defendant had, and plaintiffs had not, a later chance,
by the use of due care, to avoid frightening it. The doctrine of the last
clear chance was accepted. The court said 90 "One who is so far innocent
that he can recover for an injury to his person or property, may also recover whatever sum he, by reason of his relation to the wrong, has been
compelled to pay a third person. If the plaintiffs could recover for an
injury to their horse caused by the accident, they may recover the sum
which they paid to Clapp." In other words, the indemnity case is treated
exactly the same way that a torts case would be treated; it is treated as a
torts case, even though the theory of recovery is necessarily that of unjust
enrichment. If the set of facts is one to which the last clear chance doctrine
is applicable, it makes no difference whether the plaintiff's injury was to his
person, his horse, or his pocketbook-his right to recover is measured by
the same standard. It is submitted that this is as it should be. 9 It needs
no argument to show that the facts in the New Hampshire case just stated
are virtually the same as those in Davies v. Mann.9 2 No reason of policy
has ever been brought forward to differentiate the two, and the only difference of any kind between them is that in the indemnity case the area of the
plaintiff's loss, for which he seeks recovery, has been a little greater. It is
162 N. H. i5g (1882).
91At i6o.
'Professor Bohlen many years ago took the opposite attitude, referring to the New
Hampshire case as a "sheer anomaly". Bohlen, Contributory Negligence (I9O8) 21 HARv.

L. REV. 233 at

242-3.

analyze the whole
nize the similarity
rule in negligence
o10
M. & W.

It should be noted, however, that his article does not purport to

group of contribution and indemnity cases. It altogether fails to recogin operation of the contributory negligence rule and the no contribution
cases.
546 (Ex. 1842), the famous Donkey Case generally credited with giving

rise to the doctrine of the last clear chance.
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almost as though defendant had run down two of plaintiff's donkeys instead of one. The difference in total loss for which the plaintiff seeks recovery, and the fact that the loss took two forms instead of one, seem
altogether unimportant distinctions between the cases, so long as the
93
causative factors active in producing the loss were substantially similar.
Not many cases have arisen in which this precise point as to the right
to indemnity was raised. In no discovered case in which the point was
raised has the right been rejected, and there have been other cases in which
it was explicitly accepted.9 4 There is another group of cases, however, in
which the same results have been reached on similar facts, though with
different language used in the opinions. A fair sample of these cases is
Austin Elec. Ry. Co. v. Faust,"5 in which a street car had collided with a
horse-drawn ice wagon, causing the team to run away and injure a third
party, who recovered a joint judgment against the street car company and
the ice company. The ice company claimed indemnity from the street car
company, basing its claim on evidence that the street car operator could
have stopped his car after he saw that the wagon was in a dangerous position from which it could not escape. The court overruled the street car
company's demurrer, saying "But as to the two negligent parties, if the
negligence of one was merely passive, or was such as only to produce the
occasion, and the other negligent party was the active perpetrator of the
wrong, the former may recover over against the latter." So in City of
Weatherford Water, Light & Ice Co. v. Veit,96 an electric company's wire
was negligently allowed to remain uninsulated on a pole very close to which
a telephone company with knowledge of the condition of the electric wire
put up a pole and wires. The telephone company's negligence in failing to
give warning of the danger to one of its employees sent by it to work on its
pole was held by the court to be active negligence, as distinguished from the
"Cf. Shield v. Johnson & Son Co., 132 La. 773, 61 So. 787 (1913), saying "The doctrine of last clear chance cannot be invoked by joint tortfeasors against each other. It has
been applied only in those cases in which the injured party has been negligent in exposing
himself to peril." The same general language is to be found in a number of other cases.
See Pacific Tel. & T. Co. v. Parmenter, i7o Fed. i4o (C. C. A. 9th, i9o9); Cordiner v.
Los Angeles Trac. Co., s Cal. App. 400, 91 Pac. 436 (i9o7); Bradley v. Becker, 321 Mo.
405, i S. W. (2d) 8 (1928). But in none of the cases making such statements was any
question of indemnity involved; in all of them the statement arose out of attempts between
joint tortfeasor defendants to limit the injured plaintiff's right to an action against the one
of the defendants who had a last clear chance to prevent the injury. And all the court
decided in any of these cases was that the plaintiff's right was complete against the tortfeasors jointly and severally, and that they would have to settle their own dispute in a
separate action between themselves. At no time did a court say, nor would it have been
appropriate on the issues for it to say, that no such separate action between the defendants
could later be brought.
"Colorado & So. Ry. Co. v. Western Light & Power Co., 73 Colo. 1o7, 214 Pac. 3o
(ig92), is the clearest case. Colonial Motor Coach Corp. v. New York C. R. R. Co., 131
Misc. 891, 228 N. Y. Supp. 5o8 (1928), and Knippenberg v. Lord & Taylor, 193 App. Div.
753, 184 N. Y. Supp. 785 (192o), contain strong dicta.
9"63 Tex. Civ. App. 9i, 133 S. W. 449 (1911).
98 196 S. W. 986 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). See also Southwestern Tel. & T. Co. v. Krause,
92 S. W. 431 (Tex. Civ. App. igo6).
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electric company's passive negligence in maintaining the uninsulated wire,
so that the electric company was entitled to indemnity against the telephone
company for damages paid to the employee who was injured by contact
with the uninsulated wire. In such cases as these, it is obvious that the talk
about passive and active negligence is artificial, that the distinction between
passivity and activity is a wholly indistinct one,97 and that the court is really
giving indemnity against the one who had the last clear chance to avoid
the injury.
An interesting variation of the last clear chance situation remains to
be noticed. It arises out of the well known principle of proximate causation,
that one causing a physical injury to another will be liable not only for the
immediate injury but also for the results of negligent treatment of the
injury by a physician selected with reasonable care.9 The point to be considered is as to whether the one causing the original injury can in turn
recover from the negligent physician the amount by which his negligence
increased the former's liability. It has been held that such recovery over
is permissible. 99 In a sense, the rule of proximate causation just alluded to
is one imposing liability regardless of fault, and in that sense the grant of
indemnity lines up with that in the first group of cases discussed in the
latter half of this paper. It is improbable, though, that any rule of proximate causation, imposing liability for the consequences of negligent or intentional wrongdoing, can be referred to as imposing liability without fault,
however far the consequences may be removed from the original wrongdoing. The right to indemnity can as well be supported on the theory that
the negligent intervener had the last opportunity to prevent the aggravation
of the injury. Under either theory the result seems eminently desirable.
IV
The three fields of tort indemnity so far dealt with are all fairly well
formulated in the cases, definitely and expressly in the language herein used.
There remains, however, a considerable body of cases in which indemnity
is granted to one who has been held liable in tort for his own negligence in
failing to discover and remedy a dangerous condition created by the negligence or wrongful act of the one against whom indemnity is given. It has
been pointed out that in these cases such last clear chance as there may have
A striking example of this artificiality occurs in Eastern Texas Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
27 S. W. (2d) 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 193o). There had been a collision between a street

car and a truck, injuring a third person. The court said "The operator of the street car
was guilty of negligence in failing to sound the bell before entering the street intersection
and in stopping the street car in the street intersection and in failing to keep a lookout for
vehicles in approaching the street intersection and in failing to stop the street car immediately before entering the intersection. These acts of negligence were merely passive
. The court then referred to the truck driver's negligence in ramming the street car
as active, and held the street car company therefore entitled to indemnity from the truck
owner. At 918.
98For collection of cases, see Note (1914) 48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1i6.
"'Fisher v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 173 Wis. 57, iSo N. W. 269 (i92o).
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been on the facts was generally in the one to whom indemnity was
awarded. 10 0 The reasons given by courts in deciding this body of cases
are various and uncertain; no clear cogent analysis and classification of them
has ever been fixed on. Sometimes, in municipal corporations cases particularly, courts will first hold that an injured person can recover from both
or either of two parties, on the ground that one negligently created a
dangerous condition and that the other negligently failed to discover and
remedy it, and then pass on to say that the second can have indemnity from
the first on the ground, among others, that he is liable only by inference
of law for, and not as a participant in, the active misconduct of the first.
Such reasoning of course is contradictory, and in no sense helpful. Most
of the cases rely on the idea that the one receiving indemnity was guilty of
passive negligence only while the other was guilty of active negligence, or
on the idea that he was not in pari delicto with the other, or on both ideas.
While these ideas at least suggest intelligible reasons for allowing indemnity
in some cases, they are not very useful in selecting the particular cases in
which indemnity is to be allowed, because they lay down no definite standards or rules for analysis of cases. And any attempt to get aid by analogies
drawn from contributory negligence must fail, for here there has been
definite development beyond the limits of that doctrine.
The uncertainty and unreality of a distinction between active and
passive negligence as a test of the right to indemnity has already been
pointed out in the last clear chance cases. 10 1 In those cases the so-called
passive negligence came first and the active negligence later. In the remaining cases which rely upon this language as a basis for granting indemnity 102 the active negligence came first and the passive negligence came
later, taking the form of failure to discover and remedy the dangerous
situation created by the active negligence. The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance may furnish a fairly good description of the cases,
or of some of them, and it is not to be denied that it is a fundamental sort of
distinction which is at the bottom of a great deal of the common law of
torts.' 0 3 But it is not a clear distinction; misfeasance and nonfeasance
shade into each other, and in many cases a given set of facts can with a
little ingenuity be described as either the one or the other, at the describer's
Bohlen, supra note 91, at 243.
Supra notes 95, 96, 97.
For typical cases, see Standard Oil Co. v. Robins Dry Dock & Rep. Co., mspra note
76; South Western Bell Tel. Co. v. Eastern Texas Pub1. Service Co., 48 F. (2d) 23 (C.
C. A 5th, 193) ; Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Macon Ry. & Lt. Co., 14o Ga. 309, 78 S. E. 931
(1913); Pullman Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co., 147 Ky. 498, 144 S. W. 385
(1912) ; Astoria v. Astoria & Columbia River Ry. Co.; 67 Ore. 538, 136 Pac. 645 (1913) ; East
Texas Public Service Co. v. Johnson, 6 S. W. (2d) 344 (Tex. Com. App. 1928). Cf. Portland v. Citizens Tel. Co., 2o6 Mich. 632, 173 N. W. 38: (1919), in which indemnity was
refused, because both parties deemed active, neither passive.
u3 Sed Bohlen, Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability (i9o8) 56 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 217, 316.
10
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will.'0 4 The cases in which this passive-active language has been used to
explain grants of indemnity are all within one or the other of the two fact
situations mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, whereas other
possible instances of joint passive and active negligence, such as cases of
concurrent rather than successive negligence, or of failure to remedy an
already discovered dangerous condition created by another, 10 5 are not generally treated as giving rise to a right to indemnity. The inadequacy of the
words "passive" and "active" as a test of the propriety of allowing indemnity
in hard cases must be apparent.
The other formula of language, which occurs even more frequently
in the decided cases, is to the effect that indemnity will be allowed where
the tortfeasors are not in pari delicto.10 6 Here again is an idea which has
real meaning, one which has had genuine influence on the shaping of numerous common law rules. It has long served to indicate an area within which
the law's unwillingness to concern itself in quarrels between wrongdoers
was somewhat slackened. It is valid as a general reason, though a rather
vague one, for allowing indemnity in some cases and in others not. Yet it
cannot possibly serve and never has served as a complete and accurate
measure for the right to indemnity between tortfeasors in the cases as they
arise. It is used to support decisions already arrived at. More or less
substantial differences in degree of fault could be discovered between tortfeasors in a great many joint liability cases in which the law has never
suggested any grant of indemnity to the one least at fault. Complete observance of the dictum that indemnity will be allowed between joint tortfeasors not in pari delicto would carry the common law beyond the farthest
point to which comparative negligence has ever gone, and beyond the broadest definitions of the doctrine of the last clear chance. Actually, of course,
no such extension has ever been contemplated. The language is used merely
in reference to cases within the three general fields of permissible tort indemnity already dealt with, plus the fourth field in which indemnity is given
to one whose only negligence was a failure to discover and remedy a dangerous condition formerly created by the misconduct of the one against whom
indemnity is given.
There seems no good reason for failing to formulate the rule in the
reasonably clear form just indicated. That states what happens in the cases,
regardless of the more general language used. It represents what happens
For example, see Eastern Texas Elec. Co. v. Joiner, supra note 97.

'See infra note 112.
I For typical cases, see Middlesboro Home Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 214

Ky. 822, 284 S. W. 104 (1926) ; Lowell v. Boston & L. Ry. Co., 23 Pick. 24 (Mass. 1839) ;
Churchill v. Holt, supra note 78; Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N. Y v. North Western Tel. Exch.
Co., 14o Minn. 229, 167 N. W. 8oo (1918); Busch & Latta Painting Co. v. Woermann
Constr. Co., supra note 76. Cf. Larkin Co. v. Terminal Warehouse Co., supra note 46,
in which indemnity was refused because parties deemed to be in pari delicto.
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in the municipal corporations cases 107 as well as in the cases where the
contest is between private parties.1 08 That the allowance of indemnity in
such cases produces a result fairer than that of leaving the whole burden
on the one now given indemnity cannot be denied; as between the two
parties the courts have clearly seen the greater responsibility of the one who
created the dangerous situation.'0 9 This idea has been emphasized by some
of the decisions which draw an analogy to implied warranties in the law of
sales. These are for the most part cases in which defective and dangerous
articles have been furnished by one to another for a particular use, the one
furnishing them being required to indemnify the other for damages paid
to third persons injured by the articles. 110 The party receiving indemnity
was negligent in his failure to discover the defects, therefore liable to third
persons, but the one who furnished the article created the dangerous situation and led the other to believe it was not dangerous. Probably a contract
action on implied warrant), of fitness, as such, would niot be broad enough
to cover a right to tort indemnity, but it comes very close to it, and certainly
serves by analogy to support the allowance of tort indemnity."' One confusing point remains in this group of cases: If one person creates a dangerous condition, and a second, being under a legal duty to discover and remedy
it, discovers it but does not remedy it before a third person is injured, is
the second person still entitled to indemnity against the first? The courts
have generally treated the tortfeasors as being in pari delicto under these
112
circumstances, and have said that the equality of fault bars indemnity.
In a leading case reaching an apparently opposite result " 3 it seems that the
city, which received indemnity from the creator of a dangerous situation,
'Washington

Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, supra note 77; Des Moines v. Des

Moines Water Co., 188 Iowa 24, i75 N. W. 821 (i92o); Lowell v. Boston & L. Ry. Co.,

supra note io6; Astoria v. Astoria & C. Ry. Co., sapra note 102; and literally hundreds of
other cases. See (1912) 4o L. R. A. (N. s.) ii65; (1929) 62 A. L. R. io67; (931) 7o A. L.
R. 1358, 1386.
See cases cited supra notes io2 and io6.
This does not mean, of course, that a division of the burden between them, by contribution, might not be a still fairer result.
' Mowbray v. Merryweather, i Q. B. 857 (1895) ; Mallory S. S. Co. v. Druhan, supra
note 76; Boston Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N. E. 657 (i9o0); Busch &
Latta Painting Co. v. Woermann Constr. Co., supra note 76; Wanamaker, Inc. v. Otis
Elev. Co., 228 N. Y. 192, 126 N. E. 718 (i92o); and see Pfarr, et at. v. Standard Oil Co.,
165 Iowa 657, 146 N. W. 85i (1914).
I Of course there may be express contracts, either oral, written, or by bond, to indemnify another against tort liability, either as it may arise out of particular transactions, or
generally. These contracts are enforceable as such, unless public policy causes them to
be treated as illegal contracts. Eureka Coal Co. v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., supra note 45;
Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill. 331, 141 N. E. 739 (923) ; Ecuyer
v. Benevolent Ass'n of Elks, 152 La. 73, 92 So. 739 (1922). Suchicontracts are generally
deemed legal unless they are made in direct contemplation of known tortious acts to be intentionally committed. See 3 WIULISTo,
CoNmTcrs § 1751.
"2 Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Swift & Co.; Larkin Co. v. Terminal Warehouse Co.; Cain
v. Quannah Lt. & Ice Co., all .mtpranote 46; Galveston v. Gonzales, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 538, 25
S. W. 978 (1894).

And see Nashville v. Singer & Johnson Fert. Co., i27 Tenn. io7, 153 S.

W. 838 (913).
" Chicago City v. Robbins,

2

Black 418 (U. S. 1862) ; s. c. 4 Wall. 657 ( U. S. 1866).
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had done about all that it could be expected to do toward making things
safe when it repeatedly warned the defendant to eliminate the danger. To
allow indemnity in cases where one under a legal duty to correct a dangerous
situation has done nothing toward that end despite knowledge of all the
facts would be to shift the whole burden of loss onto one tortfeasor from
another whose improper conduct is fully as odious. Perhaps contribution
ought to be allowed on such facts, but the decisions seem quite sound in
their denial of entire indemnity. That right should be limited to cases in
which the plaintiff's negligence consisted of no more than a failure to discover and remedy a pre-existent dangerous condition created by the defendant.
V
It must also be remembered that obligations to do acts may be delegated, for example by contract. A city under legal obligation to maintain
a public structure in safe condition may contract with an individual to take
complete charge of such maintenance. The absence of an express agreement
to indemnify the city against liability for unsafe conditions in the structure
will not affect the right to such indemnity. The individual's failure to perform his contract obligation amounts to the same thing as the creation of
the dangerous condition in the cases dealt with in the last paragraph, and
the extent of the right to indemnity is identical. 11 4 The same is of course
true of such contracts between private persons. 115 And the situation in
which a municipal corporation is by statute or city ordinance enabled to
require abutting landowners or others to maintain streets, sidewalks and
the like in safe condition is in no respect different from the contract cases;
there has been an effective delegation, as between the parties themselves, of
the duty to remedy defects.116 This does not lessen the rights of the injured person against the municipal corporation, but it does create a right to
indemnity in the municipal corporation whose only fault has been a failure
to discover and remedy the defect, against the one to whom it has validly
delegated the duty. These delegations of duty operate only to extend
slightly the area of permissible indemnity outlined in the fourth main group
of indemnity cases herein indicated.
-Robertson, et al. v. Paducah, 146 Ky. 188, 142 S. W. 370 (1912); Campbell v.
Somerville, 114 Mass. 334 (1874) ; Brooklyn v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 47 N. Y. 475 (1872).
' Fuller Co. v. Otis Elev. Co., 245 U. S. 489, 38 Sup. Ct. i8o (1918) ; Georgia Power
Co. v. Banning Cotton Mills, supra note 78; Chicago Rys Co. v. Conway Co., 219 Ill. App.
220 (1920) ; Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121, i6 N. W. 698 (1883) ; Boston &
M. R. R. Co. v. Brackett, 71 N. H. 494, 53 AtI. 304 (19o2) ; New York Consol. Ry. Co. v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 193 App. Div. 438, 184 N. Y. Supp. 243 (12o)); aff'd.,
233 N. Y. 547, 135 N. E. 912 (1922), and see Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 566.
n' Detroit v. Chaffee, 70 Mich. 8o, 37 N. W. 882 (1888) ; Ashley v. Lehigh & WilkesBarre Coal Co., 232 Pa. 425, 81 Atl. 442 (1911). There have been some cases contra. See
(io8) 12 L. R. A. (N. s.) 949, and cf. (1923) 24 A. L. R. 387.
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Conchlsion
The area within which the law grants indemnity between tortfeasors
is not great. There seems to be no particular reason why it should be
broadened. Indemnity between tortfeasors serves a good purpose when
as between them substantially the whole of the fault was in the one against
whom indemnity was given. Roughly, that is the area within which it is
now permitted. As between others jointly liable for torts, it is submitted
that contribution should be allowed. This result is admittedly inconsistent
with the doctrine of contributory negligence and related rules; it causes the
law to settle between litigants disputes arising out of their own misconduct.
But the reasons given against adjudication of such disputes, at least as
between joint tortfeasors, are of doubtful validity, and are completely offset
by the social evils which accrue from refusal to adjudicate the disputes.
The deciding factor, then, should be fairness as between the parties. That
calls for the allowance of contribution.

